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Dirk Brounen∗ and Piet M.A. Eichholtz∗∗
This study examines the stock price reactions on announcements of both
equity and debt offerings by European property companies. The unique setting
in which corporate tax rates vary between different countries enables us to
test established theories in the ﬁeld of capital structure. In accordance with
theory, we ﬁnd a negative price reaction on equity offering announcements,
which is less severe for low-tax countries and positive price reactions on the
announcements of debt offerings. Besides tax arguments, we also test
alternative explanations by analyzing variations in stock reactions based on
differencesintherelativesizeoftheissue,thepre-offerleverage,theunderlying
property types, and operational performance. The results show that corporate
taxation, issue size, and operational performance are signiﬁcant explanatory
factors in the negative price reactions.
Capital structure theory is one of the most puzzling issues in the corporate
ﬁnanceliterature.Numerousempiricalstudieshaveshownthatannouncements
of seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) cause negative price reactions, whereas
the news of an additional debt issue is followed by an increase in stock prices.
The majority of these studies use capital structure arguments emphasizing the
importance of tax shield beneﬁts from debt ﬁnancing as the explanation for this
phenomenon. In this paper, we investigate whether differences in tax regimes,
the relative size of the issues, the pre-offer debt-to-equity ratio, the underlying
property type, and/or the operational performance can account for the price
reactions to issue announcements that occurred in various European property
share markets over the last decade.
The idea to test whether tax arguments can account for market reactions to
the news of security issues by investigating tax-exempt companies is not
novel. Howe and Shilling (1988) investigated the stock price reactions to the
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announcementsofnewsecurityissues,bothdebtandequity,oftax-exemptReal
Estate Investment Trusts (REITs). They found both the classical positive price
reaction on debt issue announcements and the negative price reaction on equity
issues. Documenting these typical price reactions in the absence of corporate
taxation caused them to attribute these market reactions to the alternative
negative signaling explanations. Ghosh, Nag and Sirmans (1999, 2000)
repeated this effort by investigating a larger and more recent REIT sample
and reported results that corroborate those of Howe and Shilling. But although
the issue has been analyzed frequently over the years, some of the most
fundamental questions on the cause of price reactions remain unanswered.
One key attribute of this paper is that it investigates a unique data set consisting
of European rights issues that occurred in countries with different tax regimes.
Thissettingenablesustoisolatetheimpactofcorporatetaxationandatthesame
time test alternative hypotheses that will be discussed in the next section. After
explaining the data collection procedures and methodology, we will present
our results on stock price reactions. We then test several explanations for these
market reactions by investigating factors we derived from theory. The paper
ends with concluding remarks.
Review of Literature and Hypotheses
Over the years, numerous studies on capital structure theory have appeared.1
Modigliani and Miller (1958) became the ﬁrst to theorize the issue by posing
their “M&M capital structure irrelevance proposition.” By stating the
circumstances under which capital structure does not inﬂuence ﬁrm value, the
authors isolate factors that can explain why daily observations of reality prove
theopposite.Inacommentthatfollowedﬁveyearslater,ModiglianiandMiller
(1963) showed how the relaxation of one of their crucial initial assumptions,
the absence of corporate taxation, could be attributed to the understanding
of empirical ﬁndings that typically exhibit negative price reactions on equity
offering announcements. These two classical publications triggered a stream
of studies and hypotheses over time that contributed to the clariﬁcation of “the
capital structure puzzle.”
Howe and Shilling (1988) were the ﬁrst to study the capital structure issue
for listed property by analyzing price reactions to the news of security issues
of REITs. They attributed the resulting negative price reactions to SEO
1 A thorough summary of empirical evidence and hypotheses applying to the stock
market reaction to security offerings is given by Smith (1986).Capital Structure Theory 617
announcements to the negative signal content of equity offerings. Jaffe (1991)
disputed this reasoning and argued that under a general model, based on
Modigliani and Miller (1958), the value of a partnership, REIT, or related
entityisinvarianttoleverage.Themostrecentcontributiontothisdebatecomes
from Ghosh, Nag and Sirmans2 (1999, 2000) who reexamined the issue by
investigating a sample of equity offerings in the U.S. REIT market that
occurred in the period 1991–1996. In accordance with Howe and Shilling
(1988), they document negative price reactions on equity offering announce-
ments and ﬁnd evidence for the dominance of alternative hypotheses over the
tax-based model. The focus of this paper is to contribute to this ongoing
discussion by offering outcomes originating from a unique European data
sample that enables us to test both the tax-based model and the alternative
hypotheses that will follow next.
Themostpopularcapitalstructuremodelisthestatictrade-offtheory.3 Itclaims
thattaxshieldbeneﬁtsofdebtﬁnancingneedtobeadjustedforﬁnancialdistress
costs that rise with increasing debt levels, creating an optimal capital structure
thatbalancesbothforces.Issuingequitymeansmovingawayfromthatoptimum
and should therefore be interpreted as bad news. The magnitude of this effect
should be related to the size of the tax burden. Given the diversity of corporate
tax rates in our sample, we can test whether the size of the price reaction is
related to the corporate tax regime or not.
One of the alternative hypotheses that we will test is the so-called implied cash
ﬂow change hypothesis,4 which claims that by raising additional resources, a
company signals that the net operating cash ﬂows of current operations are
disappointing. In the opinion of investors, changing the ﬁnancing policy may
indicate that the future looks less bright than expected. Since relatively large
issues imply more severe cash ﬂow changes, we expect equity offerings of
relatively large size to be associated with more severe price reactions than
issues of more modest magnitudes.
A second signaling hypothesis is the informational asymmetry hypothesis.I n
this hypothesis Myers and Majluf (1984) assumed that ﬁrm managers have
2 McDonald (1999) also analyzed the capital structure issue for real estate investments,
but contrary to Howe and Shilling (1988) and Ghosh, Nag and Sirmans (1999, 2000)
his examination is of a more theoretical nature.
3 Variouspapershaveanalyzeddifferenttypesoftrade-offsbetweencapitalstructureand
corporate taxes (Modigliani and Miller 1963), personal taxes (DeAngelo and Masulis
1980), and transaction cost of bankruptcy (Kraus and Litzenberger 1973).
4 This hypothesis originates from Miller and Rock’s (1985) analysis of dividends.618 Brounen and Eichholtz
superior information about the true value of the company. Managers will
therefore time a new equity issue if the market price exceeds their own
assessment of the stock value—if the stocks are overvalued by the market.
Since investors are aware of the existence of the information asymmetry, they
will interpret the announcement of an equity issue as a signal that the listed
stocks are overvalued, which subsequently will cause a negative price reaction.
Althoughinformationasymmetryisdifﬁculttomeasure,wefollowtheexample
of Ling and Ryngaert (1997), who showed that the transparency of property
companiesvariesamongthedifferentpropertytypes.Thesevariationsarepartly
due to differences in lease contract structures. Ofﬁces, for instance, are typi-
callymanagedusinglong-termleasecontractsinwhichthefuturerentisknown
in advance. Retail properties, however, are often managed using percentage
rent contracts in which future rents are linked to the sales of the store, which
make future rental inﬂows harder to predict, thus increasing information asym-
metry.
AnalternativehypothesiswederivedfromBaylessandChaplinsky(1991)isthe
debt market accessibility hypothesis. The rationale of this theory is based upon
the consideration of investors for the decision of managers to issue equity. If a
company is already highly levered, it will be regarded as being relatively risky
by capital suppliers. Hence, accessing the debt market will be less attractive
and issuing additional equity becomes a sound decision. Assuming investors
reason in this manner, we expect highly levered equity issuers to be associated
with better post-issue stock performance than issuers with relatively low debt-
to-equity ratios.
A more recent stream of literature focuses on the slump in operational
proﬁtability that tends to occur in the year following a security issue. This
phenomenon has been documented by studies like McLaughlin, Saﬁeddine
and Vasudevan (1996, 1998) and Loughran and Ritter (1997). A general
explanationforthispost-issueslumpinearningsoriginatesfromJensen’s(1986)
free cash ﬂow theory, which claims that managers have incentives to invest
issue proceeds in unproﬁtable projects due to agency problems causing
earningstodecrease.Asecondexplanationforthepost-issueoperationalslump
istheslowstartofnewprojectsthatareinitiatedwiththeproceedsoftheissues.
In the case of property companies, these projects are real estate assets that will
need to be leased, managed, and maybe renovated, which will take time and
delayoptimalpayoffs.Boththeseexplanationsindicatethatequityofferingsare
likely to be followed by a year in which earnings slow down, which can drive
thenegativepricereaction.InlinewithFriday,HowtonandHowton(2000),we
will investigate whether this operational slump is also present in the European
listed property market.Capital Structure Theory 619
Data and Methodology
Data
By combining the Global Property Research database with Datastream and
the Bloomberg News Retrieval Services, we retrieved the necessary data on a
sample of seasoned equity offerings for the period 1990 to 2000. Our efforts
resulted in a unique data set covering 113 SEOs in 13 different countries and
26 debt offerings in 6 different countries. Table 1 provides a distribution of
the sample by country and by year. Besides the announcement dates and the
corresponding stock return series, we also obtained the offering size, the pre-
offer debt ratio, the underlying property types, and the corporate tax rate for
each offering in our sample.
Methodology
A number of studies5 suggest that the traditional single-factor CAPM model is
inappropriate for measuring price effects in the case of real estate investments
since they are particularly sensitive to unexpected changes in inﬂation and
interest rates. Therefore, in accordance with Howe and Shilling (1988), we
analyze the price effects of equity offering announcements by applying the
mean adjusted return (MAR) model, which is developed by Masulis (1980).
In analyzing the impact of announcements of equity and debt offerings on
stock rates of returns, we constructed time series of 60 daily stock return
observations prior to and after the announcement date of each offering in our
sample. After excluding day 0 and day +1, we deﬁne the remaining time series
asthecomparisonperiodreturns.6 Assumingthatthereturnprocessisstationary
and that the time series are representative for the security’s return distribution,
we consider the mean daily return of this time series to be “the normal return.”
By subtracting these normal returns, we adjust the event day returns for general




[Rt−60i + Rt−59i +····+Rt−1i + Rt+2i + Rt+3i
+····+Rt+60i], (1)
5 See Brueggeman, Chen and Thibodeau (1984) and Titman and Warga (1986) for a
wider discussion on the matter of suitability of single-factor CAPM models for real
estate investments.
6 Day +1 return is excluded to ﬁlter effects of announcements that have been made after
trading on day 0.620 Brounen and Eichholtz
Table 1  Distribution of announcement dates by country and by year.
Panel A: Sample Distribution by Country
Rights Debt Rights Debt
Country Issue Offering Country Issue Offering
Austria 7 0 Norway 3 3
Belgium 3 0 Portugal 2 1
Denmark 4 0 Spain 11 2
Finland 1 0 Sweden 7 0
France 1 6 Switzerland 15 0
Germany 15 0 United Kingdom 35 13
The Netherlands 9 1
Total 113 26
Panel B: Sample Distribution by Year
Rights Debt Rights Debt
Year Issue Offering Year Issue Offering
1990 3 0 1996 13 0
1991 4 1 1997 18 5
1992 3 0 1998 13 6
1993 21 0 1999 15 12
1994 10 0 2000 8 1
1995 5 1
Total 113 26
Panel C: Tax Regimes for Property Companies
Corporate Tax Corporate Tax
Country Rate Country Rate
Austria 34% Norway 28%
Belgium∗ 0%∗ Portugal 37.4%
Denmark 34% Spain 35%
Finland 28% Sweden 28%
France 33% Switzerland 22%
Germany 39% United Kingdom 29%
The Netherlands 0%∗∗
∗ThecorporatetaxrateinBelgiumis0%forcompanieswiththeso-calledSICAFIstruc-
ture. To qualify as such, a company has to comply with certain regulations. Investing
solely in real estate, a maximum of 20% of investments in one single asset, and not more
than 33% of assets as borrowing capacity are the most prominent ones. Furthermore, at
least 80% of proﬁts have to be distributed to investors.
∗∗Dutch property companies are structured as so-called “erkende beleggingsinstellin-
gen,” which means that they have to distribute at least 95% of their proﬁts in dividends.
Being an “erkende beleggingsinstelling,” the property companies do not have to pay any
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Rni =Normal return of company i.
Rt−60i =Rate of return of company i on event day −60.
N =The number of event days in the comparison period.
Next we formed “portfolio” returns by averaging adjusted stock returns across
common event dates. Given that these returns were from different calendar
times and are therefore independent in event time, these daily returns allowed
us to call upon the Central Limit Theorem. This allows us to apply standard
t-tests of signiﬁcance of the excess returns of each event day.
MARt = (1/M)
 
[Rti − Rni], (2)
MARt = Mean adjusted return across companies on event day t.
Rti = Rate of return of company i on event day t.
M = The number of companies in the sample.
To study longer term price effects we also derive cumulative mean adjusted





CMAR−t,ti = Cumulative mean adjusted returns for company for event period
− t until t.
Findings
First we studied the price reactions to the announcements of additional eq-
uity offerings. The results of our computations are stated in Table 2 and show
a signiﬁcant negative adjusted return of −0.707% on the announcement day.
This outcome supports the ﬁndings of Howe and Shilling (1988) and Ghosh,
Nag and Sirmans (1999, 2000), who reported announcement day returns of
−0.603% and −0.416%, respectively. The cumulative two-day return of both
the announcement day and the following trading day of −1.181% illustrates
the cumulative effect of the postannouncement effect, which turns the cu-
mulative returns into severely negative ﬁgures after the announcement of the
offering.
Table 3 presents the outcomes we document for the market reactions to the
announcements of debt issues. For the announcement day, we report a modest
nonnegative price reaction of 0.102%, on average. The sign of the reaction
corresponds with previous results of Howe and Shilling (1988), but, contrary
to their outcomes, we ﬁnd a statistically signiﬁcant reaction. The modest but622 Brounen and Eichholtz
Table 2  Mean and cumulative adjusted returns around European equity issues.
Day Relative to Mean Cumulative
Announcement Adjusted Adjusted
Day Return t-Statistic Return t-Statistic
−10 −0.013% −0.06 −0.014% −0.06
−9 −0.287% −1.87 −0.297% −0.97
−8 −0.103% −0.60 −0.424% −1.11
−7 −0.025% −0.11 −0.466% −1.07
−6 0.088% 0.41 −0.341% −0.66
−5 0.008% 0.04 −0.341% −0.69
−4 0.033% 0.18 −0.324% −0.61
−3 −0.175% −0.69 −0.516% −0.89
−2 0.251% 1.49 −0.263% −0.41
−1 −0.026% −0.14 −0.260% −0.37
0 −0.707% −3.22 −0.990% −1.43
+1 −0.474% −1.93 −1.476% −2.07
+2 −0.122% −0.60 −1.607% −2.21
+3 −0.218% −1.08 −1.776% −2.39
+4 −0.058% −0.22 −1.858% −2.25
+5 −0.300% −2.03 −2.161% −2.54
+6 −0.331% −2.97 −2.495% −2.92
+7 −0.342% −1.94 −2.849% −3.27
+8 0.208% 0.70 −2.640% −2.84
+9 −0.091% −0.42 −2.709% −2.87




Mean adjusted returns (MARt) are cross-sectional averages for a given event day. The
cumulative adjusted returns are simply the cumulated versions of these mean adjusted
returns for the period beginning 10 days prior to the announcement day and ending 10
days following the announcement day.
The cumulative mean adjusted return (CMAR0,1) is derived from the mean adjusted
return for the period of the announcement day and the ﬁrst day following the offering
announcement.Capital Structure Theory 623
Table 3  Mean and cumulative adjusted returns around European debt issues.
Day Relative to Mean Cumulative
Announcement Adjusted Adjusted
Day Return t-Statistic Return t-Statistic
−10 −0.188% −0.43 −0.188% −0.43
−9 0.304% 0.92 0.116% 0.23
−8 −0.074% −0.37 0.042% 0.08
−7 0.478% 1.59 0.520% 0.89
−6 −0.588% −1.31 −0.067% −0.09
−5 −0.456% −1.25 −0.523% −0.67
−4 −0.091% −0.36 −0.614% −0.73
−3 −0.227% −0.69 −0.841% −0.90
−2 −0.206% −0.52 −1.048% −1.07
−1 0.438% 1.26 −0.609% −0.63
00 .102% 0.26 −0.508% −0.46
+1 −0.006% −0.02 −0.514% −0.42
+2 0.050% 0.18 −0.465% −0.36
+3 −0.134% −0.56 −0.598% −0.46
+4 0.328% 0.96 −0.270% −0.20
+5 −0.106% −0.28 −0.376% −0.28
+6 0.192% 0.77 −0.184% −0.14
+7 0.116% 0.34 −0.068% −0.05
+8 −0.143% −0.25 −0.211% −0.13
+9 −0.072% −0.29 −0.283% −0.19




Mean adjusted returns (MARt) are cross-sectional averages for a given event day. The
cumulative adjusted returns are simply the cumulated versions of these mean adjusted
returns for the period beginning 10 days prior to the announcement day and ending 10
days following the announcement day.
The cumulative mean adjusted return (CMAR0,1) is derived from the mean adjusted
return for the period of the announcement day and the ﬁrst day following the offering
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positivetwo-andthree-daycumulativemeanadjustedreturnsdonotstrengthen
this result. However, the fact that the price reactions are nonnegative weakly
conﬁrms the implications of capital structure arguments that claim that the
beneﬁcial tax shields of debt ﬁnancing cause nonnegative market reactions to
debtofferingannouncements.Moreover,theoutcomeisinlinewiththeimplied
cash ﬂow hypothesis, which states that issuing debt sends a positive signal to
themarketinwhichthecompanyprovestobeconﬁdentenoughaboutthefuture
to take on additional ﬁnancing costs.
To ﬁnd out whether international differences regarding equity announcement
reactions exist, we compared national samples with respect to average and
cumulative excess returns. Table 4 contains information on price reactions that
we gathered for the U.K. and Dutch/Belgian samples. The U.K. mean adjusted
return of −1.014% on the announcement day was signiﬁcantly stronger than
the Dutch/Belgian mean of only −0.157%. This difference in price reactions
corresponds with the difference in tax regimes of the two countries. The Dutch
andBelgianpropertycompanies,whichareexemptfrompayingcorporatetaxes,
experience hardly any negative price reactions when announcing the issuance
of additional equity. However, their U.K. competitors, which are subject to
a corporate tax rate of 29%, experience a quite dramatic price reaction.
Besides the difference on the announcement day itself, we also ﬁnd
differentaftermarketpricebehavior.IntheU.K.sample,thenegativesentiment
lasts for many subsequent trading days, whereas the Dutch/Belgian sample
exhibits a mixed sentiment following the event.
Explanations
In this section, we analyze to what extent the hypotheses and theories that we
discussed in the second section are capable of explaining the cross-sectional
variationinpricereactionstoequityofferingannouncements.Firstwewilllook
for cross-sectional patterns based on differences in relative issue size, pre-offer
debt-to-equity ratios, underlying property types, and tax bracket. The results,
which are given in Table 5, give support to the implications we derived from
the hypotheses.
We ﬁnd stronger negative price reactions for the relatively large equity issues
compared to those for smaller issues: −1.430% and −0.347%, respectively.
This result is in line with the implied cash ﬂow hypothesis, which posits
that relatively large issues imply larger negative changes in expected proﬁts.
Furthermore, we ﬁnd milder price reactions for issues belonging to the group
with the highest pre-offer debt-to-equity ratio. This outcome corroborates the
debt market accessibility hypothesis, which attributes this difference in price
reaction to variation in investors’ sympathy, which is larger for companies thatCapital Structure Theory 625
are heavily leveraged and therefore must turn to the equity market to raise
additional funding.
Panel C shows that the cross-sectional pattern we document with respect to
differences in corporate tax rates corresponds with the outcomes we stated in
Table 4. Again we ﬁnd that companies subject to relatively high tax rates are
associated with the most drastic negative price reaction. Our results regarding
the underlying property type are more scattered, indicating that companies
specialized in industrial property suffer from the least severe negative price
reactions.Overallourresultsindicatethatcompanieswithaspecializedproperty
portfolio experience a milder price reaction after announcing an equity issue.
To test the operational slack hypothesis, we analyzed the proﬁt development of
the companies in our sample around the issue year. In this analysis, we gather
annual Return on Capital Employed (RCE) ratios for each company in our
sample from Datastream.
RCE =
Pre-tax Proﬁts + Total Interest Charges
Net Capital Employed
∗ 100% (4)
Pre-tax Proﬁts=The pre-tax proﬁt, including associates, adjusted for
extraordinary items, nonoperating provisions, and ex-
change proﬁts and losses.
Total Interest Charges=Theinterestonbankandconvertibleloans,bonds,and
debentures.
Net Capital Employed=Total Capital Employed + Borrowings repayable
within one year − Total Intangibles − Future Income
Tax Beneﬁts.
TheoverallaverageRCEforourEuropeansampleoverthesampleperiodequals
5.55%. Table 6 provides our results concerning the offering events. Compared
to the previous years, we ﬁnd increasing RCEs, indicating that issues occur in
prosperous times. For the years following the equity offerings, we document
a fall in RCE from 5.96% to 4.96%, on average. This post-issue decrease is
present in both our mean and median series, and the decrease occurred in 75%
of all cases, indicating that the phenomenon is both signiﬁcant and robust.
To truly isolate the impact of the different factors on the mean adjusted returns,
we perform multivariate regression analysis. We regress the announcement day
mean adjusted returns on four factors: relative size, pre-offer debt-to-equity
ratio, corporate tax rate, and underlying property type. Since the operational






















Table 4  Mean and cumulative excess returns around U.K. and Dutch/Belgian equity issues.
United Kingdom The Netherlands/Belgium
Day Relative to Mean Adjusted Cumulative Mean Adjusted Cumulative
Ann. Day Return t-Statistic Adjusted Return t-Statistic Return t-Statistic Adjusted Return t-Statistic
−10 0.774% 1.62 0.774% 1.62 0.010% 0.04 0.010% 0.04
−9 −0.057% −0.20 0.717% 1.18 0.146% 0.53 0.156% 0.47
−8 −0.140% −0.87 0.577% 0.89 −0.210% −0.73 −0.054% −0.14
−7 −0.147% −1.05 0.429% 0.63 0.259% 1.29 0.205% 0.44
−6 0.049% 0.32 0.479% 0.66 −0.208% −1.07 −0.002% −0.01
−5 −0.036% −0.11 0.443% 0.54 0.037% 0.09 0.035% 0.05
−4 0.459% 1.12 0.902% 1.04 −0.060% −0.39 −0.025% −0.04
−3 0.102% 0.27 1.003% 1.08 −0.259% −0.66 −0.284% −0.29
−2 −0.170% −0.74 0.834% 0.87 0.212% 0.54 −0.072% −0.09
−1 0.407% 1.27 1.240% 1.12 0.011% 0.03 −0.061% −0.07
0 −1.014% −2.25 0.227% 0.17 −0.157% −0.55 −0.219% −0.30
+1 −0.376% −1.12 −0.149% −0.11 −0.231% −0.48 −0.450% −0.48
+2 −0.463% −1.55 −0.613% −0.44 −0.660% −1.03 −1.110% −1.11
+3 −0.356% −1.38 −0.968% −0.69 0.211% 0.95 −0.900% −0.93
+4 −0.448% −2.30 −1.416% −1.00 −0.124% −0.34 −1.024% −0.82
+5 −0.745% −3.35 −2.161% −1.44 −0.184% −0.68 −1.208% −0.89
+6 −0.467% −2.93 −2.628% −1.75 0.506% 1.51 −0.702% −0.49
+7 −0.276% −0.80 −2.904% −1.85 −0.030% −0.13 −0.732% −0.49
+8 −0.364% −1.37 −3.268% −2.10 −0.033% −0.17 −0.764% −0.50
+9 −0.021% −0.04 −3.289% −2.03 0.290% 0.56 −0.474% −0.36

























Table 4  continued
Cumulative Excess Returns
CMAR0,1 −1.390% −2.50 −0.389% −0.79
CMAR0,2 −1.853% −2.68 −1.049% −1.38
Mean adjusted returns (MARt) are cross-sectional averages for a given event day. The cumulative adjusted returns are simply
the cumulated versions of these mean adjusted returns for the period beginning 10 days prior to the announcement day
and ending 10 days following the announcement day.
The cumulative mean adjusted return (CMAR0,1) is derived from the mean adjusted return for the period of the announcement day
and the ﬁrst day following the offering announcement.628 Brounen and Eichholtz
Table 5  Cross sections of mean adjusted announcement day returns.
MAR0 t-Statistic
Panel A: Relative Size of the Offer
Small, <50% −0.347% −1.41
Medium −0.686%∗∗ −2.18
Large, >95% −1.430%∗∗ −2.34
F-statistic 1.383
Panel B: Pre-offer Debt-to-equity Ratio
Low, <40% −0.997%∗∗∗ −3.16
High, >40% −0.416% −1.53
F-statistic 1.917
Panel C: Corporate Tax Rate
Low, <29% −0.327% −1.42
High, >29% −0.822% −1.62
F-statistic 0.903
Panel D: Underlying Property Type
Diversiﬁed (n = 35) −0.956%∗∗ −2.13
Specialized (n = 78) −0.595%∗∗ −2.72
Retail (n = 30) −0.601% −1.56
Ofﬁce (n = 25) −0.717% −1.48
Residential (n = 17) −0.769% −1.57
Industrial (n = 6) −0.064% −0.07
F-statistic 0.188
The relative size of the offering is measured as the capitalization of the issue divided by
the pre-issue market capitalization of the company.
The debt-to-equity ratio is computed by dividing the pre-offer total debt by the pre-offer
market value of the ﬁrm.
Specialization is determined by looking at the asset portfolio of the company. Compa-
nies investing more than 70% of their total assets in one property type are considered
specialized.
The Anova F-statistics test equality of means of all cohorts.
∗∗∗Signiﬁcant at 0.01 level.
∗∗Signiﬁcant at 0.05 level.
in the regressions.
MAR0 = a + b1Relative Size + b2Pre-offer Debt Ratio
+b3Corporate tax rate + ε (5)
MAR0 = a + b1Relative Size + b2Pre-offer Debt RatioCapital Structure Theory 629
+b3Corporate tax rate + b4Specialized + ε (6)
MAR0 = a + b1Relative Size + b2Pre-offer Debt Ratio
+b3Corporate tax rate + b4Ofﬁce + b5Retail
+b6Residential + b7Industrial + ε (7)
The results we documented for both models are stated in Table 7. Concern-
ing the size variable, we ﬁnd robust results, indicating a negative relation
between issue size and announcement day return that supports the previous
cross-sectional pattern. With respect to the pre-offer debt level, the positive
sign of the coefﬁcient coincides with our previous results, supporting the debt
market accessibility hypothesis. In this case, however, the results are not sta-
tistically signiﬁcant. Concerning the third variable, the corporate tax rate, the
outcomes exhibit the theoretically consistent negative sign, robustness, and
statistical signiﬁcance. Regarding the underlying property type, our results
are mixed and lack signiﬁcance, consistent with our cross-sectional results.
Diversiﬁed companies seem to experience a slightly more negative reaction
on announcements of equity offerings, whereas property companies
specializing in industrial real estate suffer from the least severe price
declines.
Table 6  Operating performance analysis.
Panel A: Return on Capital Employed Ratio
Year (−2) Year (−1) Year (0) Year (+1) Year (+2)
Mean 5.16% 5.81% 5.96% 4.96% 5.84%
Median 5.59% 5.64% 5.94% 5.17% 5.29%
% Positive 94.29% 95.00% 97.73% 95.45% 100.00%
Panel B: Change in Return on Capital Employed Ratio
−2t o0 −1t o0 −1t o+10 t o +1 0 to +2
Mean 1.08% 0.18% −0.76% −0.99% −0.38%
Median 1.03% 0.05% −0.25% −0.46% −0.95%
% Positive 65.71% 52.63% 35.00% 25.00% 31.58%
The annual RCEs are derived from Datastream, using the formula:
RCE =
Pre-tax Proﬁts + Total Interest Charges
Net Capital Employed
∗ 100%
The year in which the issue has taken place is denoted as Year(0), the ﬁrst year
following as Year (+1).630 Brounen and Eichholtz
Table 7  Multivariate regression analysis on equity issues.
CMAR0,1 CMAR0,1 CMAR0,1
Constant 0.008 0.005 0.011
(0.74) (0.41) (0.87)
Relative size −0.041∗∗ −0.041∗∗ −0.042∗∗
(−2.39) (−2.39) (−2.39)
Pre-offer debt ratio 0.012 0.010 0.016
(0.53) (0.47) (0.66)
Corporate tax rate −0.044 −0.042 −0.064∗
(−1.59) (−1.61) (−1.84)
Specialized 0.004
(yes = 1, no = 0) — (0.41) —
Ofﬁce 0.008
(yes = 1, no = 0) —— (0.66)
Retail −0.009
(yes = 1, no = 0) ——(−0.82)
Residential 0.007
(yes = 1, no = 0) —— (0.64)
Industrial 0.007
(yes = 1, no = 0) —— (0.49)
F 2.992∗∗ 2.283 1.756
R-squared 0.081 0.083 0.112
The t-statistics are stated in parentheses and are based on heteroskedasticity-consistent
standard errors.
With respect to the underlying property types we used “diversiﬁed” as the omitted
variable for comparison purposes.
∗∗Signiﬁcant at 0.05 level.
∗Signiﬁcant at 0.10 level.
Conclusions
This paper documents the price reactions to the announcements of security
offerings by European property companies. In accordance with the existing
literature, we ﬁnd a modest nonnegative price reaction following the
announcements of debt offerings and a signiﬁcantly negative price reaction
for the announcement of equity issues.
Our data set enabled us to distinguish between equity offerings that differed in
corporate tax rates, relative size, underlying property type, pre-offer debt ratio,
and operational post-issue performance. By performing both cross-sectional
cluster and multivariate regression analysis we investigated differences in
price reactions depending on these factors. The negative relationship between
issue size and price reaction gives support to the implied cash ﬂow hypothesis.Capital Structure Theory 631
The positive relation between the pre-offer debt ratio and the price effect
corroborates the debt market accessibility hypothesis. Furthermore, we
document a negative relation between the corporate tax bracket and the
announcement reaction. This indicates that companies facing higher corporate
tax rates are punished more severely by their investors when they announce an
equity issue, which corresponds with the implications that ﬂow from the static
trade-off theory. Concerning the underlying property type, we ﬁnd mixed
results indicating that the negative price reaction is the most severe for
companies with a diversiﬁed property portfolio. Finally, regarding the
operational performance, we discovered the typical post-issue slump in
earnings in the ﬁrst year following an equity offering. This result coincides
with previous studies and indicates that offering proceeds are not contributing
to the ﬁrm proﬁtability, which might explain why stockholders react negatively
on the news of an equity issuance.
WethankHansop’tVeldofKempen&Co.,JeroenBeimerofGlobalPropertyResearch,
JaySa-Aadu,andallparticipantsoftheGlobalRealEstatesessionattheAREUEA2001
annual meeting in New Orleans for helpful comments.
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